... konulu sunumlar: "Kant and Information ethics Savaş Takan “SAPERE AUDE”"— Sunum transkripti:
Kant and Information ethics Savaş Takan “SAPERE AUDE”
KANT (eleştirel felsefenin babası ) “Aydınlanma, insanın kendi suçu ile düşmüş olduğu bir ergin olmama durumundan kurtulmasıdır. Bu ergin olmayış durumu ise, insanın kendi aklını bir başkasının kılavuzluğuna başvurmaksızın kullanamayışıdır. İşte bu ergin olmayışa insan kendi suçu ile düşmüştür; bunun nedenini de aklın kendisinde değil, fakat aklını başkasının kılavuzluğu ve yardımı olmaksızın kullanmak kararlılığını ve yürekliliğini gösteremeyen insanda aramalıdır Sapare Aude! Aklını kendin kullanmak cesaretini göster! Sözü şimdi Aydınlanmanın parolası olmaktadır.”
KANT (eleştirel felsefenin babası ) “Başkasının aklını ödünç alma, kendi aklını kimseye emanet etme. Düşünmeye, öğrenmeye cesaret et.” “Öyle davranışta bulun ki, bu davranış herkesin uymak zorunda kaldığı evrensel bir hareket olsun” “herkesin nasıl davranmasını istiyorsan sen de öyle davran”
KANT ( Etik ) kişisel amaçlarımızı karşılamak için diğer insanları araç olarak kullanmamamız gerektiği ilkesidir (Pehlivan, 1998: 29). Bütün bireyler biricik ve insan oluşlarından dolayı değerlidir, o nedenle herkese eşit ve saygılı davranılması gerekmektedir. Kant’a göre ahlâki kusursuzluk, doğruluk ve dürüstlük olarak tanımlanabilecek erdemli davranış, ilkelere uygun davranmak anlamına gelmektedir. Fırsatçı, çıkarcı bireyler erdemli değildirler. Bir bireyin erdemli sayılması için, ahlâki ilkeleri içselleştirmesi ve bunları eylemlerinde kılavuz olarak alması doğrudur (Pehlivan, 1998: 28).
Kant (Etik) “Kendi aklının kitle önünde, kamuoyu önünde ve hizmetinde serbestçe ve açık bir biçimde kullanılması her zaman özgürce olmalıdır; ve yalnızca bu tutum insanlara ışık ve aydınlanma getirebilir; buna karşılık aklın özel olarak kullanılışı [der Privatgebrauch], genellikle çok dikkatlice ve dar bir alanda kalacak bir biçimde sınırlandırılabilmiştir ve bu da aydınlanma için bir engel sayılmaz. Kendi aklını kamu hizmetinde kullanmaktan [der öffentliche Gebrauch], bir kimsenin, örneğin bir bilginin bilgisini ya da düşüncesini, yani aklını, onu izleyenlere, okuyanlara yararlı olacak bir biçimde sunmasını anlıyorum.”
Abstract our reasons for seeking to bring Kant to bear on contemporary information and computing ethics (ICE).
GOALS Building trust online Regulating the Internet Search engine algorithms should be made public Kantian approach to ethical issues in ICE
The papers developed from workshop Kant revisited in light of new technology: Consciousness, identity and public reason/judgment,’’ (March 19–20, 2007), at NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim.
Kantian perspective was chosen for examining new technologies address both philosophers but also the engineering faculties. his philosophy takes up all the basic aspects of philosophical interest that are of importance to new technologies: epistemology, ethics and political philosophy and aesthetics.
Kant’s basic thoughts on autonomy and the public domain are highly relevant to challenges concerning modern society, particularly to communication in the public sphere. Trust is but one important topic being discussed here; openness another. Thus, our aim has not only been to demonstrate how Kant can be productively applied to new technology; in addition, it has been to show how the basic philosophical queries raised within this context can be fruitfully explained within Kant’s conceptual frames.
Bjørn Myskja Kantian on the matter of trust Kantian thought to the problem of regulating the Internet and the Web: Myskja thereby argues for an important middle ground between excessive regulation and no regulation at all.
Bjørn Myskja Kant in the (in)famous example of the Categorical Imperative requiring us to tell the truth even to those obviously bent on harm, Myskja points out that in Kant’s later work, a more realistic understanding of human nature and thereby, a more nuanced understanding of the role of deception emerges. Brieﬂy, deception may take place for less than ideal reasons – but as deception allows us to hide our more negative characteristics while nonetheless developing more virtuous character, it can help us become better persons. This role of deception ﬁts wonderfully well with what is otherwise often regarded as a highly morally problematic dimension of online communication – precisely that we can there hide our real selves.
Bjørn Myskja Myskja’s application of Kant to the problem of trust online issues in a rather striking insight regarding the larger debates over trust, regulations, etc. Over against the potential polarities of an entirely ‘‘unruly’’ Internet and an excessively regulated Internet, this Kantian approach argues for a middle ground. In this middle ground, su ﬃ cient rules and regulations will apply to protect the innocent from the evil. But these rules and regulations will remain partial in the sense that they will not eliminate freedom of choice regarding possible visions of good to be realized online – including the possibility (but only as one possibility) of becoming an excellent or virtuous human being in the Kantian sense.
Thorseth she explores the implications of Kant’s aesthetics and ethics for the role of storytelling and rhetoric in e ﬀ orts to foster deliberative democracy in online environments. Dewey’s ‘‘problem of the public,’’ i.e., the di ﬃ culty of e ﬀ ectively communicating with one another, as citizens and as policy makers, in complex contemporary societies.
Thorseth Thorseth points out that Kant’s notion of reﬂective judgment is of possible judgments, in con- trast with actual judgments – where the former refer to something virtual in the sense of what is possible for human beings to imagine. For Thorseth, the well- known virtual world of Second Life stands as an example of a virtual reality in which a key condition of reﬂective/possible judgment is met – namely, that we are able to avoid the illusion that our purely private and personal conditions somehow constitute an objective context or reality.
Thorseth In these diverse ways, Thorseth sees that ICTs – as they facilitate communicative venues that allow Kantian reﬂective judgment and enlarged thought to come into play – may thereby provide a solution to Dewey’s problem of the public. In particular, as she notes in her Conclusion: ‘‘The liberation of our judgments from subjective private conditions is a necessary condition for weighing our judgments with the possible judgments of others, by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else.’’
Dag Elgesem Elgesem applies these speciﬁcally to the dilemma of search engines – i.e., whether their ranking algorithms should be public or secret – arguing (perhaps surprisingly for those overly focused on Kant’s (in)famous argument against lying ) in favor of the secrecy of search engine algorithms.
Dag Elgesem If the algorithms are open – then webmasters (and anyone else) interested in having their websites appear at the top of a search result will be able to manipulate their sites so as to achieve that result but such results would then be misleading in terms of genuine popularity, potential relevance to a searcher’s interests, etc., thereby reducing users’ trust in the search engine results and hence reducing the usability and accessibility of important information.
Dag Elgesem On the other hand, if the algorithms are secret, then the legitimate public interest in understanding how web pages are ranked is foiled: in particular, users cannot know whether or not a high ranking is the result of payment – and again, such secrecy reduces trust and thereby the usability and accessibility of important information.
Dag Elgesem Helen Nissenbaum in favor of the claim that search engine algorithms should be made public. He counters that Introna and Nissenbaum fail to take fully into account the problem of overwhelming spam that would result from such publicity: indeed, he points out that the anti- democratic potentials of such publicity are even greater than in the current context of (semi-) secrecy.
Dag Elgesem he concludes that while a solution to the problem of massive spamming following publication of search engine algorithms might lead to a di ﬀ erent conclusion – currently, at least, especially the Kantian principle regarding the self-preservation of reason does not support a policy requiring such publication.
Annamaria Carusi helps explain the central role visualization plays in contemporary e-Science, beginning with essential trust-building. KANT’S ACCOUNT The role of imagination as an image-building faculty the role of the sensus communis. Kant’s aesthetic theory can helpfully explain the central role visualizations may play in developing the intersubjective framework needed for trust
Susan Stuart’s concluding Stuart argues that her approach can be solidly rooted in Kant as she thinks that Kant already steps in the direction of blurring the boundaries between the real and the virtual. At the same time, however, this blurring leads to Stuart’s concluding and urgent warning: we are well advised to begin thinking about the ethical dimensions of the disappearance between the real and the virtual now.
Susan Stuart’s concluding Kant remains directly relevant to contemporary concerns in Information and Computing Ethics (ICE) – Stuart thus sketches out for us how we must review and revise Kantian conceptions in order to further exploit their potential fruitfulness for our reﬂections.